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ii. 
The aim of this study is to explicate the concepts transference 
and countertransference from the psychoanalytic, interpersonal 
and cybernetic perspectives. Commonalities and differences in 
definition are described. The notion that transference and 
countertransference provide the therapist with objective 
interpersonal information concerning the patient or client system 
is explored. It is pointed out that whilst, according to the 
tenets of second-order cybernetics, objective interpersonal 
information is not possible, transference and countertransference 
analysis, nevertheless, according to this viewpoint, provide the 
therapist with a double description. Such a description may 
influence the therapist's interpretation or understanding of the 
system at hand and be a component then also of the co-
constructed, therapeutic reality of the therapist and patient or 
client. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Transference is the manifestation of the morbid habits of 
the patient towards the psycho-analyst. Let us take the 
case of the neurotic who was terrified in childhood by a 
brutal schoolmaster. He has more or less completely 
forgotten the painful scenes in which he figured. In the 
course of analysis he will manifest inexplicable attacks 
of terror towards the physician. (Dalbiez, 1941, p.211) 
As is suggested by Dalbiez•s (1941) description and as 
will be shown by the theory to be discussed in chapters 2 and 
3 of this dissertation, the concept of transference is an 
important aspect of psychoanalytically-based therapy. This is 
so because it is in the transference that the patient is 
understood to bring the "morbid habits" (Dalbiez, 1941, 
p.211), which govern his or her problematic relationships to 
therapy. 
Transference is not the domain of the patient alone. 
Therapists also experience transference, although in their 
case it is termed countertransference. Countertransference, 
defined as "the analyst's projection on to the client of 
emotions which originated in his or her own personal history" 
(Bootzin, 1980, p.iv) may influence the therapeutic process 
substantially. 
2. 
Implicit in this definition is a view of 
countertransference as a negative force which hampers 
psychotherapy. From an alternative perspective, however, 
countertransference may be regarded as a source of information 
which contributes positively to the therapeutic process. Such 
a perspective has been espoused by Racker (1968) and Kiesler 
(1982a) and is discussed in chapter 5. 
Transference and countertransference are concepts 
developed by Freud in his psychoanalytic theory. For Freud, 
our inner life was to be seen as a battleground beset by tense 
struggles between competing forces (Byrne & Kelley, 1981). 
This battleground was divided into three levels or 
states: the conscious, the preconscious, and the unconscious. 
The conscious level consists of present perceptions and 
thoughts; the preconscious level includes past memories which 
are more or less available to consciousness when required; and 
finally, the unconscious level consists of all the past 
events, present impulses, desires and unacceptable images of 
which one is not aware (Byrne & Kelley, 1981). 
All these present impulses, desires and unacceptable 
images of which one is not aware constitute the id. 
Essentially, the id represents primitive animal instincts 
which are threatening to the superego and hence, cannot be 
expressed in an unleashed way. The superego represents the 
internalization by a person of the values and moral codes of a 
society. Another word for superego might be conscience. The 
id operates in accordance with the demands of the pleasure 
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principle which may be understood as the demand for immediate 
satisfaction of bodily needs. The aim of the id is, 
therefore, to obtain pleasure and avoid pain. The ego, within 
the conscious and preconscious levels, on the other hand, acts 
to gain the same pleasurable ends in accordance with the 
requirements of reality. It is the task of the ego, 
therefore, to mediate between the demands of the id and the 
constraints of the superego (Byrne & Kelley, 1981). 
The ego reacts to threat from the id by defending itself 
by means of various defense mechanisms. One of these defense 
mechanisms is displacement. It occurs when an unconscious 
impulse is directed towards a person or object other than the 
one upon which it was initially focussed. When it occurs in 
psychotherapy, this phenomenon is then termed transference 
(Hjelle & Ziegler, 1976). 
As a consequence of displacement, the threatening or 
forbidden id impulses deriving from problematic relationships 
are, in the transference, forced to be discharged in a 
constant manner upon the therapist (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1976). 
Hence Dalbiez's (1941, p.211) description of "morbid habits". 
If one understands the transference to be some sort of 
repetition in therapy of the patient's "morbid habits" 
(Dalbiez, 1941, p.211), then the concept has a central role to 
play in the various interpersonal approaches. Clearly "morbid 
habits" could be abstract metaphors used to indicate 
maladaptive interpersonal or interactional styles. 
4. 
These interpersonal approaches focus on observable 
interactions among people rather than the inner workings of 
the psyche. Little attention was, however, paid to the 
concepts of transference and countertransference within the 
interpersonal movement until the 1980's. That such concepts 
should finally be utilized is not surprising since the role of 
the therapist in influencing the patient's interactional 
patterns or "morbid habits" is emphasised by this approach 
(Swart & Wiehahn, 1979). 
The interpersonal perspective also sets a great store on 
the role of present factors in generating maladaptive patterns 
of behaviour. Whilst it may be acknowledged that a person's 
problems have originated in early childhood, the effective 
causes today are understood to reside in his or her present 
interactions. These present interactions are important, not 
only in terms of the reinforcement they provide for 
problematic behaviours, but also in terms of the meanings, 
fantasies and wishes that they generate (Wachtel, 1987). 
Clearly then, transference, as an analysis of an interaction 
within the particular context that is the therapeutic setting, 
has much to offer the therapist or theorist adopting an 
interpersonal approach. 
Such a theorist is Anchin (1982), whose view of 
transference is described in detail in chapter 2. Whilst, 
another interactional theorist, Kiesler's (1982a) 
identification of countertransference as an "impact message" 
(p.275), implicit in the patient's interaction with the 
5. 
therapist, is discussed in chapter 5. 
Like Anchin (1982) and Kiesler (1982a) above, theorists 
representing a cybernetic paradigm have also attempted in 
recent years to describe these concepts within the premises of 
their perspective. The two that shall be mentioned in chapter 
8 of this dissertation are: Colson (1985), who wrote of 
transference and countertransference patterns in 
psychoanalytic group therapy from a family systems view; and 
Mendell (1981), whose view of transference is that it 
functions as a barrier to change in a group system. 
Essentially, cybernetic epistemology is founded upon the 
principle that a human system is a self-corrective 
organisation of feedback (Watzlawick, Bavelas & Jackson, 
1967). The principle of feedback refers to a process wherein 
a part of a system's output is reintroduced into the system as 
information about the output. Such feedback may be either 
positive or negative. Negative feedback is responsible for 
maintaining homeostasis in the system, in that the information 
is used to decrease the deviation from a set norm. In the 
case of positive feedback, the information acts as an 
amplification of this deviation, so that positive feedback is 
associated with change (Keeney, 1983). 
If positive feedback is not to lead to unchecked 
escalations within a system or dissolution of the system, it 
must be subject to higher order controls. As Keeney (1983, p. 
71) points out: "In general, for the survival and co-evolution 
of any ecology of systems, feedback processes must be embodied 
6. 
by a recursive hierarchy of control circuits." One might take 
as an example here the boy, whose father physically abuses 
him. The initial feedback is provided when the child goes to 
school, where the teacher notices his bruises. As these are 
severe and interfere with the child's capacity to concentrate 
in class, the teacher reports the matter to the principal of 
the school. The principal, in terms of another level of 
feedback, contacts the child protection unit of the police 
force. Yet a higher level of feedback occurs when, the child 
protection unit, acting in accordance with the dictates of the 
law, lays a charge on the father of the child. This 
discourages him from hurting his child any further, or, in 
other words, escalating his abuse of the boy. 
When one views feedback only as it occurs to maintain 
homeostasis on one level, one is speaking in terms of first-
order cybernetics. Inclusion in one's perspective of higher 
levels of feedback brings one into the domain of second-order 
cybernetics. Hence, a view which takes in only the boy and 
his abusive father within their family system is a first-order 
cybernetic view. A view incorporating the effect of the 
actions of the schoolteacher, the principal, the child 
protection unit and so on, is a second-order cybernetic view. 
It is evident from second-order cybernetics that the 
therapist, by virtue of his or her interaction with members of 
a system, becomes, at a higher level, also a part of that 
system. One cannot, therefore, speak of influencing a system, 
without acknowledging that the system then "feeds back" to 
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influence the therapist (Hoffman, 1981). The therapist's 
observations and descriptions of a family system are, thus, 
not to be categorised as disinterested and objective 
information, but rather as feedback within that system. This 
implies that it is not possible to observe human systems 
objectively or to describe them, without, in the process, 
changing them. 
The result of all this is that it is not only important 
to describe the system, but also to describe the describer, as 
a missing aspect of the description (Varela, 1989). Following 
from this, first-order cybernetics as the cybernetics of 
observed systems has been distinguished from second-order 
cybernetics which is defined as the cybernetics of observing 
systems (Howe & Von Foerster, 1975). 
Up until the early 1980's, most cybernetically-premised 
therapy assumed a separation between the the system that was 
being observed and the observer. It was, accordingly, of a 
first-order level. Hence, research proceeded on the 
assumption that "objectivity" and therefore certainty, was 
possible (Tomm, 1983). With the possible exception of the 
Milan School who came to recognise that families may have 
their own solutions to problems, treatment was problem-
focused. It was largely based on the assumption that the 
therapist stood outside or above the observed system in 
treatment. From that position it was expected that he or she 
would fix and control it in a technological sense. The 
premise uniting both researchers and clinicians was the belief 
8. 
that objective reality "out there" was accessible to 
observation and description (Tomm, 1983). 
Second-order cybernetics, however, embodies the 
constructivist notion that description is a "construction" of 
the observing system. According to this perspective, the 
characteristics of the observer determine what he or she will 
observe (Hoffman, 1981). Objective reality may exist but it 
is not accessible to human observation. Hence Varela's (1989) 
point that it is important to describe both the system and the 
describer of the system. 
The problem is that, whilst one might expect the above 
formulation to advance information about the system in 
question, one would still be unable to obtain objectivity, 
since, to obtain objectivity, the describer of the describer 
would also need to be described, and so on. If one was to go 
for objectivity, where would one draw the line? 
The above process of description is, obviously, 
impossible. Hence, it has been advocated by people such as 
Varela (1989) and Maturana (1980) that we abandon 
"representation" and bracket objectivity as the central 
concept for understanding cognitive mechanisms. In other 
words, once one accepts that our observations are not 
representations of a reality out there, then we can no longer 
lay claim to objectivity. The notion of objectivity is 
inextricably linked to the possibility of a person's 
observations and perceptions mirroring that reality. The 
implication of abandoning both these concepts is that 
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transference and countertransference can no longer be viewed 
as reliable sources of interpersonal information in a 
therapeutic setting. 
Clearly the bracketing of objectivity, as Varela (1989) 
and Maturana (1980) suggest, is at odds with approaches based 
on first-order cybernetics, for instance that of Haley (1964). 
According to Haley, change occurs as a result of the 
therapist, as a separate entity or system, joining the 
observed system and altering it through the way he or she 
perceives it and therefore interacts in it. It is also at 
odds, with the psychoanalytic view which propounds that there 
is such a phenomenon as insight. 
Perhaps, however, interpersonal information and 
objectivity are overvalued concepts in the systems of meanings 
concerning human relationships that is psychotherapy? It is 
enough, one might argue, that, as particular forms of 
description, transference and countertransference change that 
which is described? The very action of the therapist in 
describing particular forms of behaviour within transference 
analysis and in conveying that description to the patient or 
client must, as positive feedback, inevitably change the 
behaviours of that patient or client. 
It is necessary now to turn to the origin of the 
particular form of description that is transference analysis. 
10. 
CHAPTER 2 
TRANSFERENCE IN INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOTHERAPY 
The Origin of the Concept Transference 
From as early as the eighteenth century it had been observed that the 
relationship between therapist and patient played a significant role in effecting 
outcome (Kovel, 1978). However, little conceptual attention was paid to this 
phenomenon until the advent of Freud, who first identified a transference 
relationship in the case of Anna 0. (Jones, 1957). Langs (1981) has argued that 
Freud's conceptualization of this dimension of the treatment relationship is 
perhaps the most fundamental of his contributions. 
But what was this great contribution? As Kovel (1978) points out, it was 
nothing more nor less than the observation that Freud's patients tended to treat 
him in ways approximating earlier relationships - often as a parent. At first, Freud 
considered this an impedance to the process of therapy, a resistance to 
treatment, because the attitudes revealed were not only irrational, but often 
hostile. Yet even the loving feelings that were generated appeared to be 
problematical initially. Although these feelings motivated much work on the part of 
the patient, they soon enough became obstacles to change, insofar as change 
would result in giving up the "neurosis" and hence also fantasies surrounding the 
wish for the analyst's love (Freud, 1924, p.214). 
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Eventually Freud (1924) adopted a more balanced view. True, 
transference was a resistance, but it was also the ~~neurosis" actualized . 
In his essay on "Neurosis and Psychosis", Freud (1924) explains that the 
transference neurosis comes about as a result of the ego, at the command of the 
superego, forbidding an id impulse. The ego defends itself against this impulse 
by repressing it, causing the impulse, in turn, to force itself upon the ego by way 
of a compromise. The impulse is then discharged upon a substitute, permitted 
object. In other words, the direction of the impulse becomes displaced from its 
original object to an alternative object that is acceptable to the superego and ego. 
This alternative, acceptable object is the therapist in the transference neurosis. 
Transference is, therefore, representative of "[the ego in] conflict with the id in the 
service of the super-ego and of reality" (Freud, 1924, p.214). 
Thus, in the transference, a patient's forbidden id impulses are permitted a 
compromised realization. Hence, as Mills, Bauer and Miars (1989), referring to 
Freud's work, point out, "careful attention to the unfolding relationship between 
patient and therapist [offers] an arena in which conflictual patterns of action and 
reaction [can] be identified, examined and modified 11 (pp. 338-339). 
Clearly then, if for Freud (1917), psychoanalysis was to be effective, it was 
to include both the nurturance and the careful dissolution of transference. 
Transference was the very beast to be grappled with and in its successful 
resolution lay the key to successful therapy. This is further illustrated in a letter to 
Jung in which Sabina Spielrein pointed out that: 
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Freud would never, never argue that the transference to the doctor 
[was] not simultaneously an attempt at adjustment. Why should he? 
Even if the patient transfers all his infantile attitudes (wishes) to the 
doctor, it is simply obvious that he learns in the process to adjust his 
infantile attitude to reality. (Carotenuto, 1984, p.85) 
He, furthermore, came to view transference as generally present from the 
beginning of treatment. As a positive emotion it would, as mentioned earlier, act 
to motivate the patient to pursue psychotherapy. On the other hand, transference 
became a resistance either when the patient's affection and underlying sexual 
need for his or her therapist became so strong that it provoked a reaction 
formation. Alternatively, it might also become a resistance if the patient's 
impulses were predominantly hostile instead of affectionate (Freud, 1917). 
With regard to the form assumed by these impulses in the transference 
relationship, Freud (1917) cautioned as follows: 
Suppose we succeeded in bringing a case to a favourable 
conclusion by setting up and then resolving a strong father-
transference to the doctor. It would not be correct to conclude that 
the patient had suffered previously from a similiar unconscious 
attachment of his libido to his father. His father-transference was 
merely the battlefield on which we gained control of his libido; the 
patient's libido was directed to it from other positions. A battlefield 
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need not necessarily coincide with one of the enemy's key 
fortresses. (p.509) 
The term 11 libido 11 was used by Freud to refer to the energy force by which 
the sexual instinct is represented in the mind (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1976, p. 28). 
Hence, the sexual instincts or impulses of the patient referred to in the preceding 
excerpt of Freud's might be directed, more primarily, at a need to challenge 
authority figures in order to escape from an unconscious fear of castration. 
An Orthodox Definition of Transference 
Subsequent psychoanalytically-based theorists have not always been able 
to agree with all the aspects of Freud's conceptualization of transference (Rank & 
Ferenczi, 1925). Despite varying points of view, some of which shall be discussed 
later, Freud's discovery, nevertheless, remained an integral consideration in any 
psychoanalytically-oriented, psychodynamic therapeutic endeavour. 
Psychodynamic therapy, according to Kovel (1978), refers to any therapy which 
assumes an interplay of forces within what is understood as the 11 mind 11 • 
Greenson (1965), considering the various usages of the concept within the 
field of psychodynamic therapy, attempted to create an orthodox definition of the 
concept. He, accordingly, defined transference as: 11the experiencing of feelings, 
drives, attitudes, fantasies, and defenses towards a person in the present which 
are inappropriate to the person and are a repetition, a displacement of reactions 
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originating in regard to significant persons of early childhood" (p. 156). 
Greenson (1965) was reasonably successful in that, according to 
Ehrenreich (1989), his definition has been widely accepted. It is based on the 
following three assumptions, all of which owe their existence to Freud's earlier 
theoretical work: 
1. Transference is inappropriate to the present situation; 
2. It implies a repetition of a past reaction; and 
3. Transference arises idiosyncratically from a particular early experience of 
the patient. 
Clearly, therefore, for Greenson (1965), work with transference in any 
psychodynamically-oriented therapy is founded on the premise that feelings, 
attitudes and behaviours generated in therapy are to be investigated in order to 
understand and modify a patient's historically-based, characteristic manner of 
relating to significant people in current life. It is also founded upon the 
assumption that such behaviour may be viewed objectively and independently of 
any countertransference-based perceptions. 
Transference Resolution 
The means of dissolving the transference was perceived at first as twofold. 
Firstly, the analyst or therapist sought not to gratify the transference wishes 
directly. Secondly, transference wishes were to be resolved through interpretation 
or telling the "truth" about the meaning of what was taking place (Freud, 1979). 
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In this regard, use was made also of dreams as the indirect expressions of 
transference wishes (Dalbiez, 1941 ). Such interpretations involved conveying to 
the patient that his or her feelings did not derive from the present situation, but 
that they were a repetition of a past event. The significance of that past event, in 
its determination of the patient's present psychic structure, would then be 
analysed. For example, a patient, whose early life experiences were filled with a 
sense of isolation and abandonment might experience strong feelings of anxiety 
and rejection at the prospect of terminating her sessions with her therapist. On 
exploration, it might also emerge that this particular patient tends to cling to 
members of her family and to colleagues at work and that she is strongly lacking 
in self-confidence. The patient's emotional response to leaving her therapist, as 
well as her dependency needs and poor self-concept, could then be interpreted 
as deriving from her earlier sense of isolation and her fear of abandonment. 
Hopefully, as a result of these therapeutic interventions (also known as 
transference analysis), transference feelings would gradually grow into what Kovel 
calls "a new edition of the infantile neurotic text" (1978, p.81 }. 
As Kovel (1978), moreover, points out: "Transference wishes are stirred up 
willy-nilly, whether the therapist cultivates them or not, but the form they assume 
depends greatly upon what the therapist does" (p. 82). 
Some of the principles on which the therapist's technique came to be 
based, may be enumerated as follows (Mills et al., 1989). They are to: 
1. work with the interpersonal manifestations of conflict; 
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2. utilize naturally-occurring positive transference to strengthen the 
therapeutic alliance; 
3. strive for an emotional experience of the transference relationship; 
4. confront transference behaviour early in therapy; and 
5. make use of the "Triangle of lnsight 11 (p. 342) -the total interpretation of 
transference should connect the patient's current life situation with experience in 
the transference and in past life. 
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Changing Conceptualizations of Transference 
and Transference Resolution 
As is evident from the principles discussed in the previous section (Mills et 
al., 1989), the current life situation of the patient came also to be considered in 
the practice of transference analysis. This is due to later work conducted by the 
Neo-Freudians which resulted in some changes in the conceptualization of 
transference and the practice of transference analysis (Ehrenreich, 1989). In fact, 
the notions of transference and countertransference have inspired a significant 
degree of both theoretical and practical analysis and revision. 
Rank (Rank & Ferenczi, 1925), for example, came to the conclusion that 
the orthodox emphasis on historical lessons learned from transference analysis 
did not result in significant change. He therefore attempted to improve treatment 
by focusing on the use of the therapy situation as a present experience rather 
than as a reincarnation of the past. Hence, he advocated an emphasis on the 
"here and now" of interaction, rejecting an investigation of the historical 
antecedents of an emotional problem - unless it highlighted a dynamic currently at 
work within the therapeutic relationship. An example of such an instance might 
be a transference-based attachment to the therapist, where the patient, whose 
father abandoned the family, relates to the therapist as a father-figure. 
According to Rank 1S (Rank & Ferenczi, 1925) conceptualization, then, the 
analysis of transference was directed, by and large, at the elucidation of present 
rather than past conflicts. Rank, therefore, would also have viewed the above 
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example of transference as possibly representing the patient's present need to 
abdicate responsibility and his or her present feelings of vulnerability. 
Fifty years later, another useful contribution to transference analysis and its 
resolution was made by Malan (1976). He shall not be discussed in any detail, 
except to mention that he re-emphasised the importance of examining both 
positive and negative feelings. Negative feelings, in particular, were to be 
identified and worked through in order to help the patient tolerate such feelings for 
other people. 
Through the years, various psychodynamic theorists and pratitioners have 
utilized the concept of transferene in various ways (Mills et al., 1989). Both Rank 
(Rank & Ferenczi, 1925) and Malan (1976) assumed, like Greenson (1965), 
however, that demarcating certain behaviour as transference, was an objective 
enterprise. 
Anchin's Interpersonal Perspective of 
Individual Transference Factors 
Rank (Rank & Ferenczi, 1925) and Malan (1976) are just two of a multitude 
of significant psychodynamic theorists to have engaged in a diversity of 
conceptualization and description of transference and its therapeutic resolution. 
Exponents of the interpersonal perspective, have, as has been mentioned in 
chapter 1, also recently generated conceptualizations of transference and its 
therapeutic resolution. 
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By focusing on the interpersonal manifestations of what psychodynamic 
theorists would view as intrapsychic conflict, Anchin (1982) has described the 
patient's idiosyncratic, inappropriate behaviour in terms of the concepts of 
"interaction sequence, interpersonal pattern and interpersonal style" (p.1 09). The 
concepts of interaction sequence, interpersonal pattern and interpersonal style 
define various units of behaviour. This behaviour is exhibited in the patients' 
interactions with classes of other people and is thus fairly enduring across similar 
situations. Significantly, Anchin reflects little uncertainty, in his work, regarding 
the possibility of any lack of objectivity in selecting and describing these units of 
behaviour. 
ForAnchin (1982), these three concepts may, accordingly, be described as 
follows: 
An interaction sequence refers to a time-bound series of concrete 
behavioral exchanges which have cognitive and affective 
concomitants, while the interpersonal pattern represents a regularity 
among these processes that may be extracted from this and other 
sequences.... The concept of interpersonal stvle represents still 
another level of abstraction, beyond that of the interpersonal pattern. 
Specifically, it encompasses the idea that across the range of 
specific self-defeating patterns that a patient plays out with 
significant others over the course of his or her day-to-day sequences 
in specific situations, there is a central theme running through a 
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great many of these patterns. (p.1 09) 
The sequences, patterns and styles described by Anchin (1982) may, 
accordingly, be organized around the patient's goals of enhancing his or her 
feelings of acceptability and self-worth. Successful in the past, they may be less 
successful at present, resulting also in emotionally painful and destructive 
consequences. 
Replacing Unsuccessful Interpersonal Styles 
Anchin (1982) points out that it is the therapists' task, irrespective of his or 
her conceptual framework, to help the patient to change his unsuccessful 
interpersonal style, or set of behaviours with other behaviours more suited to 
helping him achieve a happier and more gratifying existence. In order to 
accomplish this it is necessary to observe the patient in interaction - and to 
delineate both the content and process of interaction sequences. For Anchin: 
The process of identifying specific self-defeating consequences 
incorporates, among other options, (1) underscoring the nature of 
others' reciprocal understanding vis-a-vis the patient; (2) labelling the 
relationship messages implicit in these countercommunications; (3) 
drawing out negative implications of these countercommunications 
for the patient's self-definition and feelings of self-worth; (4) clarifying 
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the manner in which his or her rigid patterns and others' 
characteristic countercommunications impede gratification of 
important human needs, wants and desires; and (5) explicitly linking 
these consequences to the patients' dysphoric affective states. 
(p.123) 
As is evident from the above discussion, Anchin (1982) does not 
distinguish between the sequences, patterns and styles exhibited by the patient in 
relation to others, on the one hand, and those exhibited in relation to the 
therapist, on the other hand. 
He does, however, emphasise the effect of context on the interpersonal 
styles of individuals. As such, his work may be viewed as an interpersonal 
description of the concept transference. As will be evident from a discussion of 
cybernetic epistemology, it is also compatible with Bateson's (May, 1977) theory 
of learning, to be examined in chapter 8. 
Given then, the various ways in which transference may be identified and 
utilized in the service of effecting behavioural change, the question that arises is, 
what happens when the therapeutic situation is extended to include more than 
two protagonists? 
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CHAPTER 3 
TRANSFERENCE IN GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 
In the last 30 years or so, the practice of group psychotherapy has 
increased both in popularity and scope. Essentially, group psychotherapy refers 
to "any one of a number of approaches ... in which psychological problems are 
played out and worked through in a small group over an extended period" (Kovel, 
1978, p.337). Two psychodynamically-oriented theories of group transference 
shall, therefore, now be discussed briefly. 
The first, psychoanalytically-based, structural model (Saravay, 1985}, links 
transference behaviour dynamically to group developmental stages. The second 
approach, formulated by Yalom (1975}, connects transference behaviour to the 
idiosyncratic psychological and interpersonal concerns of each member. 
Before discussing the structural model, it is essential at this stage to 
describe its progenitor's, namely Freud's, understanding of groups. 
Freud's Conceptualization of Groups 
Freud's understanding of groups was rooted in the conceptualization of two 
types of emotional connection operating simultaneously (Bocock, 1983}. On the 
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one hand, there was members' acceptance of the leader as their collective 
conscience (superego) and object of respect (ego-ideal). On the other hand and 
as a result of this process, it posited that group members regress from viewing 
each other as a source of emotional and instinctual gratification, to the point 
where they relate purely in terms of a sense of identification with each other. 
Freud viewed this regression (in object relations) as inspired by anxiety arising 
from a shared oedipal transference directed at the leader who represents the 
common ego-ideal or object of respect. 
An oedipal transference is a transference based on behaviour understood, 
in terms of psychoanalytic theory, to have emerged with the activation and 
resolution of the oedipus conflict. Such resolution occurs when the child, at about 
age four or five, represses his or her love for the opposite sex parent and 
develops an identification with the same sex parent. An oedipal transference is 
therefore one in which the group leader is viewed as a parent, or collective 
conscience of the group, and forbidden love object simultaneously (Hjelle & 
Ziegler, 1976). 
It is, then, the process of transference that creates bonds between 
individuals and hence the development of a group. The notion of bonds founded 
upon members' mutual sense of identification (ego identifications) forms one of 
the foundations of the psychoanalytically-based structural model (Saravay, 1985). 
A by-product of this notion is, furthermore, the assumption that groups function 
as coherent, interdependent wholes, that the transferences of each member are 
connected to processes taking place in the group at large. 
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For Freud (Bocock, 1983), therefore, group transference was oedipal in origin. 
The regression in object relations to ego identification was accordingly inspired by 
anxiety arising from the nature of the group bond with the leader. 
This theory of oedipal anxiety was, however, later challenged by the 
discovery that small groups could be organised around preoedipal transferences 
(Saravay, 1985). Examples of such transferences include oral-dependent, oral-
aggressive, anal-retentive and anal-aggressive types of behaviour. An anal-
aggressive transference, for instance, might be characterised in terms of group 
members perceiving the leader primarily as an object to be possessed or 
controlled. 
Given such preoedipally-based behaviour, a new explanation therefore had 
to be found for the regression to ego-identification responsible for uniting group 
members. 
The Structural Model 
The new explanation for the regression to ego-identification responsible for 
uniting group members was provided by a new structural model of groups. This 
model assumes that the bond of ego-identification between members is an 
adaptive regression permitting simultaneous libidinal attachments between group 
members (Saravay, 1985}. As mentioned earlier, Freud used the term "libido" to 
refer to the energy force by which the sexual instinct is represented in the mind. 
A libidinal attachment is consequently a sexual attachment (Hjelle & Ziegler, 
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1976). 
This bond of ego-identification between members is also not necessarily 
the effect of anxiety arising from a shared oedipal transference directed at the 
leader. The structural model is able to account for the phenomenon of group 
development containing a variety of transference phases. These phases may 
then arise, not only from the oedipal stage, but from any of the stages of infantile 
development (Saravay, 1985). 
Such phases might include, for example, a movement from a 
characteristically oral-dependent group transference, through an identification 
around anal-retentive transference wishes, to the final activation and resolution of 
an oedipally-based transference (Saravay, 1985). This means that, initially, group 
members might express the wish, either overtly or covertly, to merge with the 
leader, and might relate to each other in a gullible and dependent way. 
Resolution of the above oral-dependent type of transference might then 
mark the movement towards an anal-retentive transference phase (Saravay, 
1985). At this point, members are likely to respond to feelings of uncertainty, 
perhaps generated by the frustration of earlier transference wishes, by withholding 
information from the leader, keeping silent and by forming an identification 
between members based on a culture of orderliness, punctuality and consensus. 
At such a stage, it is expected that disagreement and debate is unlikely to be 
tolerated. 
Finally, it would be hoped that the successful resolution of the above anal-
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retentive transference phase would allow the group to move towards an oedipal 
transference (Saravay, 1985). In such a transference, the leader, as a fantasised 
parent, represents an ego-ideal or superego. It would then be expected that 
members would cope with the feelings of rivalry for the attention of the leader, 
and the anxiety this generates, by becoming more cohesive. The resolution of 
this phase might then signal the advent of more mature behaviours on the part of 
group members and the ultimate termination of the group. Thus they would learn 
to postpone gratification of their desires in the group and to respond constructively 
to each other's problems and to criticism. 
The group, therefore, develops along transference phases generated by 
the various stages of infantile development. In this way, the group re-enacts 
certain significant developmental conflicts in an individually-inclusive manner. For 
this reason, group transferences are intersystemic, linking each member's id, ego 
and superego. As Saravay (1985) succinctly puts it: 
Congruent self-representations in the members' ego give expression 
to a shared unconscious wish arising in their ids, whose object, the 
leader, is represented in their ego-ideals and superego. Thus, group 
transferences require the participation of the id, ego and superego, 
and the components of the transference represented in each system 
must be derived from the same developmental stage conflict. 
(pp.202-203) 
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Saravay (1985) thus argues that, since the group is bound amongst itself 
and to the leader according to components of the same prevailing group 
transference, then both bonds are derived from the same developmental stages. 
Hence, also, these two ties advance or regress in concert with each other. 
Defenses derived from other stages and incorporated in the transference are 
likewise subordinated to the purposes of the conflictual theme present at that 
time. 
For instance, as mentioned in the preceding section, group members might 
identify around oral-dependent transference wishes on the one hand, expressing, 
on the other hand, the desire to merge with the leader who is unconsciously 
represented as the mother of the group. With the unconscious merger of 
members with the leader, the group itself then becomes the unconscious symbol 
of the mother or breast (Saravay, 1985). 
Clearly, however, as Foulkes and Anthony (1957) have pointed out, each 
member brings to a group certain conflicts and issues that are idiosyncratic. 
lnasfar, therefore, as the group process is able to incorporate common fantasies 
and conflicts, each member is able to participate fully. When the manifest content 
of group discussions fail to engage group members, they begin manipulating each 
other in the service of their own latent interests, until some sort of a compromise 
is achieved. This compromise is then organised around a particular 
developmental stage conflict with its attendant transference and, as such, forms 
also the culture of the group. Both therapist and group member are thus, 
inextricably linked. to the group transference phase. 
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Yalom's Theory of Transference in Group Psychotherapy 
Unlike the structural model (Saravay, 1985) described above, Yalom's 
(1975) theory of transference focuses almost exclusively on the bond between 
group members and the leader. For Yalom, in contrast to the more 
psychoanalytically-based structural model, transference factors are not connected 
conceptually to a group developmental stage. 
Whilst the structural model (Saravay, 1985) is based purely on 
psychoanalytic principles, Yalom's (1975) approach is, on the other hand, founded 
upon a mixture of interactional and psychoanalytically-based, psychodynamic 
principles. 
Briefly, interactional principles assume an exchange of messages and a 
reciprocity between persons. A central proposition is that an individual's 
behaviour is always to be understood as a sequential response to the behaviours 
of others (Swart & Wiehahn, 1979). 
Psychodynamic or dynamic principles, assume, as mentioned earlier, an 
interplay of forces within the unconscious (Kovel, 1978). The unconscious may, 
therefore, be likened to a battleground in which conflicting psychic forces strive for 
domination, as was described in chapters 1 and 2. Behaviour then represents the 
result of this conflict. A greater emphasis is placed, according to this view, on a 
person's underlying motivations, feelings and conflicts (Smith, Sarason & Sarason, 
1978). 
For instance, Yalom (1975) conceives of transference distortions arising 
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from the following psychodynamic manifestations: 
the displacement of affect from a previous object. For example, as 
in the case of a patient responding to a female therapist with the 
same emotions initially directed at his or her mother; feelings of 
conflict toward authority, feelings of conflict toward authority, 
dependency, autonomy, rebellion etc, which become personified in 
the therapist, and the tendency to invest the therapist with 
superhuman characteristics in order to use him or her as a shield 
against existential anxiety - an example here might be that of the 
patient who views his or her group therapist as some sort of god 
who can solve all the problems of existence. (pp.199-212) 
The said distortions, may, however, also be based on members~ explicit or 
intuitive appreciation of the great power of the therapist. Yalom (1975) points out 
that the leader1s presence and impartiality are essential for group survival and 
stability, his power being founded on his freedom to expel members, add new 
members and to mobilise group pressure against anyone he wishes. The unequal 
interaction between group leader and member, described by Yalom, thus forms 
the most fundamental breeding ground for the evocation of transference. 
Such an unequal interaction may be defined in terms of Batesonls (1979) 
conceptualisation of 11Complementary interaction~~ (p.117). Bateson conceived of a 
complementary interaction as an interaction based on the maximization of 
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difference. As such, each party's behaviour is different from, but complementary 
to that of the other party. In the above instance, the therapist's behaviour is 
different from that of each group member: the therapist's behaviour conveys 
leadership, strength, and power, whilst group members tend to respond, in most 
instances with an acceptance of the therapist's power. 
As in the case with individual therapy, for Yalom (1975), therefore, provided 
a therapist assumes the responsibility of leadership in a complementary 
interaction, transference will occur. The issue is thus not the evocation, but rather 
the resolution of transference. This is a departure from the classical approach 
which was concerned primarily with the evocation and consequent interpretation 
of its genetic roots (Ehrenreich, 1989). 
The transference having accordingly been evoked, Yalom {1975) then goes 
on to caution: 
There are some patients whose therapy hinges on the resolution of 
transference distortion; there are others whose improvement will 
depend upon "interpersonal learning" stemming from work not with 
the therapist but with another member, and there will be many 
patients who choose alternate therapeutic pathways in the group 
and derive their primary benefit from other curative factors. (p.217) 
Furthermore, Yalom (1975} indicates that: 
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Attitudes toward the therapist are not all transference based: many 
are reality based and others are irrational but flow from other 
sources of irrationality inherent in the dynamics of the group. (As 
Freud knew, not all group phenomena can be explained on the basis 
of individual psychology.) (p. 217) 
The essential point to be made for the purposes of this account is that, as 
mentioned earlier, individual transferences may, according to this perspective, 
originate in diverse psychodynamic processes and contextual factors such as 
interpersonal relationships. Unlike the structural conceptualization (Saravay, 
1985), they are, moreover, not conceptually linked to the developmental stages of 
the group or, thus, to identification processes between members. 
For Yalom (1975): "If the therapist maintains flexibility, he may make good 
therapeutic use of irrational attitudes towards him without at the same time 
neglecting other functions in the group" (p.217). 
In fact, Yalom (1975) emphasizes the importance of transference resolution for 
the purposes of good ~~therapeutic uses" (pp.202-203), which largely include 
interpersonal learning. He also, like Saravay (1985), assumes that a therapist is 
able to objectively know the interpersonal and intrapersonal dynamics of his or her 
clients. 
Having obtained information regarding transference-based interpersonal 
and intrapersonal dynamics, transference resolution may, according to Yalom 
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(1975), be facilitated both by 11 Consensual validation~~ and by increased 11therapist 
transparency~~ {p. 211 ). The former technique involves assessing the consensus 
of members' opinions or feelings associated with the therapist. Members are 
encouraged to compare their perceptions with one another and reality testing is 
thereby enhanced. The latter technique refers to the therapist's gradual and 
calculated self-disclosures. This fosters members' opportunities to confirm or 
disconfirm their impressions of the therapist. As with consensual validation, 
transparency amplifies reality testing. 
Yalom (1975) describes the behaviour of the therapist towards increased 
transparency as behaviour which encourages members to deal with him as ua real 
person in the here-and-now" (p. 203). As such, the therapist also treats any 
feedback members offer him with respect, indicating his willingness to examine 
his blind spots, to expose his feelings, and to acknowledge or refute motives or 
feelings attributed to him. 
Ultimately, however, as calculated self-revelation, transparency is subject to 
the therapeutic needs of members and to the dynamics of the group process. 
Timing is an important issue that has to be considered. A revelation which may 
be appropriate and useful at one point may be hopelessly 
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CHAPTER 4 
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE IN INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOTHERAPY 
As was indicated in chapter 2, Anchin (1982) advocated that the therapist 
analyse the self-defeating consequences of a patient's interactional style as this is 
manifested in others' reciprocal countercommunications. Clearly, one way of 
doing this is to examine the therapist's own internal responses, or 
countertransference, to the messages transmitted by the patient. Implicit in 
Anchin's work, therefore, is the view that the therapist's emotions and attitudes 
towards the patient are likely to be generated by the patient's interactional style, 
irrespective of how apparently irrational these emotions and attitudes might 
appear to be. This emphasis on the interactional style of the patient is something 
of a deviation from the classical psychoanalytic understanding of 
countertransference. This deviation will be discussed in the following section. 
The Psychoanalytic Understanding of Countertransference 
In a letter to Annie Pink, a patient whom he later married, Reich (1988), 
one of psychoanalysis' early disciples, passionately described what he understood 
to be his countertransference feelings towards her in the following way: 
Your health improved steadily; only occasionally was there distortion, 
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stemming from the recent denial which you had to experience in 
order to gain complete health. And the joy I took in you grew from 
week to week; I had long exceeded the bounds of interest which a 
male physician is allowed to take in a female patient if he himself is 
to remain free of conflicts and capable of further work. It was not 
easy for me these last few months, Annie Pink. But I wanted, yes, I 
first had to make sure that you were healthy. And just as you 
struggled with the transference, I struggled with 
11Countertransference 11 - I was surprised that you hadn't noticed. 
(p.173-174) 
As with Freud (1979), Reich (1988) perceives countertransference feelings 
as interfering with 11further work 11 (p. 173-174). This was so because 
countertransference, as the experience of intense feelings on the part of the 
therapist for his or her patient, was seen to hamper the former's objectivity. The 
task of the therapist was understood to be, in terms of psychoanalytic theory, to 
identify internal areas of conflict as these were released in the patient's style of 
interaction. In order, however, for the therapist or analyst to be able to identify 
these areas of conflict in the patient, he or she had to be as objective as possible. 
Countertransference affected this objectivity. It was this principle that led 
to the still commonly-held notion that analysts or therapists should themselves 
undergo analysis or therapy in order to make themselves aware of their emotional 
vulnerabilities as these might be expressed in countertransference (Kovel, 1978). 
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Countertransference as an Impact Message 
Kiesler (1982a), in contradiction to Greenson (1965), and the 
psychoanalytic approach discussed in the preceding section, tends to emphasise 
present rather than past relationships in his analysis of "impact messages" (p.27 4) 
which the therapist experiences in relation to the client. Implicit, however, in his 
analysis, is an understanding of countertransference or "impact messages" as the 
effect on the therapist of the client's transference. Kiesler's (1982a) focus is thus 
on the client-therapist relationship, irrespective of the form of therapy. He makes 
no separate distinctions with regard to group or family therapy. 
Briefly, Kiesler (1982a) uses the term "impact message" to represent the 
engagement or pull the therapist experiences in transaction with a client. 
Whether the client is seen individually or in a group does not appear to matter. 
These engagements may affect the therapist's emotions, action tendencies, 
cognitive attributions and fantasies in relation to that particular person. 
Interestingly, unlike the classical definition, the genesis of countertransference 
lies, for Kiesler, essentially with the client. Implicit also in Kiesler's identification of 
the "impact message" is the premise that such identification can be relied upon as 
objective information. 
In contrast to Racker (1968), who will be examined in the following chapter, 
Kiesler (1982a) does not view all clients as inducing countertransference-based 
responses in their therapist. When a therapist, however, finds himself or herself 
experiencing an 11 impact message11 , it encompasses all of the therapist's 
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responses to that particular client. This is, as shall be seen in chapter 5, also true 
for Racker's (1968) conceptualizations. 
For Kiesler (1982a}, signs that the therapist is being engaged or "pulled" in 
a certain way by a particular client, include: 
1. The therapist noticing that there is a repetitive pattern to his or her internal 
responses; 
2. The client's interruption of his or her previous baseline of pursuing 
understanding and change; and 
3. The therapist's awareness that he or she is off his or her usual baseline in 
therapy. 
For kiesler (1982a), being "off baseline" might be manifested as: 
talking more or less than usual, liking or disliking a client more 
intensely, feeling particularly brilliant or dull with a given client, and 
so on. At times the therapist may find himself tending to avoid or to 
emphasize certain topics regardless of the client's interest. Or the 
therapist may notice his own anxiety at particular moments with his 
client. (p.283) 
Kiesler (1982a} accordingly advocates that, after the therapist realises, that 
he or she is being engaged in a particular idiosyncratic way, he or she, firstly, 
interrupts the complementary response. Secondly, by making use of appropriate 
techniques, the therapist is to help the client to discontinue his or her distinctive 
37. 
evoking style. Finally, the therapist is to metacommunicate with the client about 
the 11 impact message" (p.286). 
Kiesler (1982a), places a great deal of emphasis on the therapist's 
metacommunication of the "impact message". He, in fact, makes use of the 
"impact message" in much the same way that Racker (1968), as we shall see, 
utilises a complementary identification, that is, by identifying the impact of a 
client's particular style of interaction on significant others. Here, 
metacommunication clearly also mirrors the use of the interpretation of 
transference in psychoanalytic therapy. 
Kiesler does, however, caution that whilst the client is productively working 
on some either aspect of psychotherapy, metacommunication assumes less of a 
priority. 
For Kiesler (1982a), metacommunication involves the following: 
1. telling the client both the positive and negative engagements he or she 
experiences with the client; 
2. pursuing the extent to which the client intended to elicit that effect from the 
therapist; 
3. identifying the self-definitional and relationship claim the client is intending 
to impose on the relationship; 
4. pinpointing with the client the exact pattern of verbal and nonverbal 
behaviours which produced the impact; 
5. analysing the client's extratherapy relationships with significant others in 
terms of the identified evoking style of the client; 
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6. modelling, rehearsing and reinforcing alternative, more successful and 
flexible client interpersonal styles to be used with persons in his life; 
7. using the therapeutic relationship to model and reinforce the 
metacommunicative process itself for the client to use with important persons in 
his life. 
The client thus learns to talk directly with significant others about their 
relationship communication. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE IN GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 
The classical definition of countertransference viewed the phenomenon as 
encompassing purely those aspects of the therapist's reactions reflecting his or 
her supposedly unresolved conflictual concerns. It was thus a deviation on the 
part of thetherapist from viewing the patient objectively to viewing him or her 
subjectively. Hence, countertransference was a therapy trap (Brabender, 1987). 
Furthermore, as was the case with Wilhelm Reich and Annie Pink (Reich, 1988), 
the feelings inspired, according to this notion, were, generally, of great intensity. 
In recent years, however, definitions of countertransference that include and 
encompass all of the therapist's reactions to the client have been proposed by 
both Kiesler (1982), from an interpersonal perspective, and Racker (1968), from a 
psychodynamic point of view. 
Racker's Definition of Countertransference 
Uke Kiesler (1982a), Racker (1968) did not view countertransference as a 
trap, incorporating only the therapist's unresolved issues. For Racker, 
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countertransference embraces the entirety of the therapist's unconscious and 
conscious reactions to both his or her transferential and reality needs and to 
those of group members. In other words, the group therapist, adopting this 
perspective, as with that of Kiesler (1982a), cannot differentiate his or her feelings 
and behaviours in terms of those that are supposedly countertransference-based 
and those that are not countertransference-based. He or she may, however, 
distinguish between "concordant and complementary identifications" (Brabender, 
1987, p. 551). 
Briefly, a "concordant identification" (Brabender, 1987, p.551) occurs when 
the therapist identifies with an aspect of the group member's self-representation. 
As Brabenaer, quoting Racker, points out, it is based "on resonance of the 
exterior in the interior, on recognition of what belongs to another as one's own 
('This part of you is rr• {p. 551). For Brabender, an example of such an 
identification is the situation where members of a group might be making a great 
many statements suggesting helplessness and impotence to the extent that the 
therapist begins to feel ineffectual. This experience on the part of the therapist 
can, then, be classified as a concordant identification. 
A "complementary identification'\ on the other hand, is established through 
the "therapist's resonance with an object in the patient's world" (Brabender, 1987, 
p. 553). As an example, Brabender cites the patient who complains constantly 
and repetitively of others' rejection. When the therapist begins to feel annoyed 
and desirous of getting rid of the patient, a complementary identification has been 
achieved. 
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According to Racker (Brabender, 1987), complementary identification may 
occur as a result of several interpsychic dynamics. Two, however, are particularly 
significant. Firstly, such an identification may occur in response to the patient's 
activity of projective identification with the therapist. In the example of the patient 
who complains of others' rejection, this might be that of a disengaged, 
uninterested mother figure. Secondly, it may occur as a defensive manoeuvre on 
the part of the therapist to avoid a concordant identification. Again, in the 
previous example, this might be manifested in the therapist1S own unconscious 
expectations of rejection at the hands of others. Thus, in such instances, a 
complementary identification may be assumed to be in avoidance of a concordant 
one. 
However, the opposite also holds true. The therapist who nurtures 
empathy to escape being angry with a patient is, as Brabender (1987) indicates, 
using a concordant identification to escape a complementary one. 
The point here is, as Roth (1981) indicates, not to feed a particular type of 
identification exclusively, but to be able to oscillate flexibly between the two. 
Clearly, they both have their therapeutic uses: concordant identification is a great 
resource towards achieving an understanding of both the conscious and 
repressed aspects of the patient's life. A complementary identification, as an 
object of exploration between therapist and patient, can help the latter to 
recognize the impact of his or her style of interaction on significant others. 
Irrespective of whether the identification is concordant or complementary, it is 
essentially a fount of reliable, objective information for the therapist about the 
42. 
patient or client. 
Significantly also, although Racker's {1968) classification is essentially 
descriptive , it includes, in its conceptualization, both present and past 
interpersonal events as the basis for the patient's relationship with the therapist. 
This is in distinction also to Kiesler (1982a) who, as has already been mentioned, 
tends to emphasise present relationships. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE FAMILY THERAPY MOVEMENT'S REJECTION OF TRANSFERENCE 
AND COUNTERTRANSFERENCE 
Both the psychoanalytically-based, psychodynamic approaches and the 
interpersonal approaches discussed above, assume that both transference and 
countertransference reactions are located in the individual. Whilst interpersonal 
paradigms have long been associated with family therapy {Kiesler, 1982a), this 
has not been the case with classical, psychoanalytically-based psychotherapy 
{Guerin, 1976). 
In the 1950's, at the time of the development of the family therapy 
movement, psychoanalytic psychotherapeutic principles prohibited the collection of 
a family in one room for the purposes of treatment (Guerin, 1976). One of the 
main reasons for this was the belief of most psychoanalytic theorists that if 
psychotherapists were to see a family together, the presence of relatives would 
contaminate each member's transference reactions (Guerin, 1976}. 
The espousal of a cybernetic perspective, to be discussed later, by several 
significant proponents of family therapy, presented these psychotherapists with an 
alternative way of viewing both problematic behaviour and the tasks of the 
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therapist in its treatment. 
Of most significance for the purposes of this dissertation was the fact that 
family-focused, cybernetic theorists such as Jackson and Weakland (1961) 
rejected the theory of transference (Guerin, 1976}. Such theorists, attempting to 
make use of the principles of communication theory and of cybernetics in their 
work, assumed that transference was the inextricable fruit of psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy and, therefore, irrelevant to their purposes (Jackson & Weakland, 
1961 ). 
This attitude is illustrated by an article on conjoint family therapy, in which 
Jackson and Weakland (1961 ), on the basis of certain assumptions of 
communications theory, rejected the application of the concept of transference to 
family therapy. They indicated that the inappropriate feelings that family members 
may have for their therapist might be better explained in terms of unfulfilled 
expectations. These expectations may be caused by ignorance, misinformation or 
such explanatory concepts as "All men are .... " (p. 32). Both transference and 
countertransference were, furthermore, purely a manifestation related to the 
inactivity prescribed by psychoanalytic treatment. Family therapy, on the other 
hand, contained more activity, thus militating against the creation of a context in 
which the patient was able to create a framework ~~embroidered" with "past 
personal references 11 (pp. 32-33). 
Thus, the concepts of transference and countertransference were largely 
deleted from both the family therapy movement and its cybernetic epistemology. 
The new emphasis which developed focused on viewing the patient's symptoms 
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within the context of family interaction patterns. This was founded upon the 
creation of a new epistemology within which to understand and conceptualize that 
which was being observed: an epistemology derived from cybernetics and 
communications theory (Guerin, 1976). 
This epistemology is illustrated, inter alia, in the work of Andolfi, Angelo, 
Menghi and Nicolo-Corigliano (1983). In a publication entitled Behind The Family 
Mask, Andolfi et al. describe the individual and the family as two systems in 
evolution: both systems containing and accommodating the dual needs of family 
unity and independent individual growth. Family unity, on the one hand, and 
independent individual growth, on the other hand, are both separately implicated 
in the family system 1s movements towards either instability or stability. For Andolfi 
et al., the family may be seen as a system in constant transformation. Internal 
and external pulls for change require that family members assess their 
relationships with each other and constantly reevaluate the balances in the family 
between unity and the independent, separate growth of each respective member. 
When individual growth is suppressed in the service of unity, "pathology~~ is likely 
to result. A pathology which then serves to maintain the equilibrium and 
functioning that the system has achieved. An example might be that of the family 
in which the adult children are not encouraged to date or form romantic 
attachments in order to ensure that they do not leave home. If they are to leave 
home, their parents might be forced to confront their incompatibility and separate. 
In 1985, Colson made use of Andolfi et al's (1983) theory of family 
pathology in his analysis of transference and countertransference patterns in 
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psychoanalytic group therapy. 
Colson's (1985) use of the above theory shall be examined in chapter 8 of 
this dissertation. At this stage it is important to point out that its compatibility with 
the concepts of transference and countertransference suggest that the rejection of 
the latter concepts by people such as Jackson and Weakland (1961) was not a 
necessary consequence of their acquired, cybernetic epistemology. The failure of 
these theorists to develop the notions of transference and countertransference 
within their epistemological domain may, however, also be possibly explained in 
terms of their failure to recognize the semantic plasticity of these concepts. This 
plasticity has been exploited both by the interpersonal models discussed above 
and by more recent cybernetically-influenced theorists such as Colson (1985) and 
Mendell (1981) to be discussed further in chapter 8. These theorists moulded the 
concepts of transference and countertransference to fit in with their respective 
paradigms. This is possible also because neither the concept of transference nor 
that of countertransference is unavoidably founded on a lineal and dualistic way of 
thinking. The problem with lineal and dualistic thinking as these are manifested in 
certain approaches shall be discussed in the following section. 
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CHAPTER 7 
BATESON'S CYBERNETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 
The Problem with Lineal Thinking and Dualism 
Lineal thinking involves thinking in terms of A leads to B, B leads to C and 
so on. Bateson (1979) defines it as follows: 
Linear is a technical term in mathematics describing a relationship 
between variables such that when they are plotted against each 
other on orthogonal Cartesian coordinates, the result will be a 
straight line. Lineal describes a relation among a series of causes 
or arguments such that the sequence does not come back to the 
starting point. The opposite of linear is nonlinear. The opposite of 
lineal is recursive. (p. 242) 
According to Bateson (Hoffman, 1981) then, lineal thinking, with its inherent 
identification of cause and, therefore, blame, is a one-sided, atomistic way of 
perceiving elements which are, in fact, interconnected in a relationship. Thus, A 
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acts on B, but then B, in turn, acts on A In the world of human activity, such 
relationships are organised into "systems" (p.342}, which may be defined as an 
order of people and processes in dynamic interaction. 
Dualism, in this context, involves drawing an arbitrary boundary line 
between the parts of a system or between a system and one of its parts. Such 
thinking also is incorrect for Bateson {Hoffman, 1981 }. In describing the etiology 
of behaviour, people and the human systems of which they are a part are not to 
be treated as distinct entities. 
With the exception of the structural model of group therapy {Saravay, 
1985), the psychoanalytically-based approaches and also the interpersonal 
approaches to transference and countertransference are dualistic in that the 
behaviours of therapist and client are not viewed as necessarily reciprocally 
connected. Clearly, transference and countertransference, viewed non-
dualistically, should be seen from a perspective which includes the therapist and 
client in a recursive interaction. Viewed non-dualistically, transference, and 
countertransference are the linked halves of a relationship. 
Transference behaviour is bound, in terms of its psychoanalytic 
conceptualization, to the patient's system of meanings and classes of solutions. 
With transference resolution and its attendant metacommunication, and in the 
therapist's awareness of countertransference factors, the therapist responds 
analytically, both to the patient's responses to him or herself and to his or her 
earlier responses to the patient, respectively. The patient too, in transference 
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resolution, is forced to examine his or her initial responses to the therapist. 
Therapist and patient are then forced to re-evaluate their responses to each other 
and the premises underlying these responses. 
With reevaluation, both, hopefully, alter their respective systems of 
meanings and, in the patient1S case, his or her class of solutions. Hence, the 
patient's view of the therapeutic relationship and of interpersonal relationships in 
general is likely to change. 
Furthermore, the solutions that then emerge are likely to derive not only 
from a different perspective on interpersonal relationships but also from a different 
class of solution. In other words, the solution is obtained within an altered frame 
of meanings, bound by different premises. Such an altered perspective is 
founded upon a double description in which the patient has a view of: a) how he 
or she viewed the therapist and b) of how the therapist viewed him or herself in 
relation to the patient. 
Double description, according to Bateson (1979) and Keeney (1983), is an 
epistemological tool by means of which one is enabled both to generate and to 
discern different orders of pattern and relationship. Bateson (1979) compares it 
to the synthesis and depth provided by a binocular view in contrast to a 
monocular view. In Bateson's words: 
The binocular image, which appears to be undivided, is 
in fact a complex synthesis of information from the left 
front in the right brain and a corresponding synthesis of 
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material from the right front in the left brain. Later 
these two synthesised aggregates of information are 
themselves synthesised into a single subjective picture 
from which all traces of the vertical boundary have 
disappeared. (pp. 79-80) 
The point to be made is that when one makes use of double description 
and when one views human behaviour non-dualistically, the focus of concern 
moves away from the personal system, and its internal conflicts, to the 
relationships or ecology of interpersonal transactions at hand. It is argued that 
--
the patient to emerge from a psychoanalytically-based form of therapy is likely to 
have gained some greater understanding of such an ecology. Although, such an 
understanding may be partly submerged beneath a wider concern with the 
personal system. 
In any event, when we commit the above-mentioned errors of lineal and 
dualistic thinking, of splitting the object of explanation into parts and pieces and 
speaking separately, for example, of the group and the person and of one part 
causing something in the other, we are guilty of chopping up the ecology. 
According to a cybernetic approach, there is an interdependence between these 
parts. 
This interdependence implies that a person's behaviour is inextricably 
connected, as a system, to the groups within which he or she functions (Bateson, 
1979). 
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The Importance of Context 
The groups in which an individual functions and their suprasystems would 
be seen by Bateson (1979) as the contextual background of the person's 
behaviour. May (1977) illustrates Bateson's emphasis on the importance of 
context with the following anecdote: 
The first time I ever met Gregory Bateson was at Mills College, 
where he was a member of the discussion panel at a lecture I 
. delivered. After the lecture the audience and I were arguing back 
and forth, as fruitlessly as is generally the case, about how freedom 
develops in the child in America._ Gregory roused himself on the 
' ., 
platform to volunteer,· 'The child develops freedom in the context of 
the family. 11 Since then· I have found the word context emerging in 
all kinds of forms in. Bateson's thinking. (pp. 84-5} 
According to Bateson (May, 1977), the patient in transference views the 
analyst in a particular context and, thereby, obtains meaning from the otherwise 
unknown situation. Hence the patient will respond to the analyst as a daughter, 
son or whatever. 
In the interests of a contextual awareness, Bateson (Keeney, 1983}, 
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furthermore, argued repeatedly that clinicians were to view the world through the 
lens of a cybernetic epistemology. Such an epistemology involves seeing the 
universe as an organisation of multitudes of interdependent, hierarchical systems, 
of which one of the smallest might be the animal cell. 
In addition to understanding the function and organisation of the cell within 
the context of an animal organ, a cybernetic epistemology also provides a way of 
understanding psychological symptoms and pathology in the following way. For 
Bateson (Keeney, 1983), all systems were understood to be organised through 
processes of change. This means that, in a human group system, an individual's 
behaviours and the group's sequences of interaction are constantly changing. 
One could not, however, understand fluctuations within the individual without 
looking also at the wider fluctuations of the group system. 
The so-called healthy individual's systemic organisation is characterised by 
a balanced repertoire of alternating behaviours and emotions which are then 
represented by the ever-changing, adaptations of the group organism to the wider 
social context. 
The members of a group situated within a context which is, for some 
reason, seen as pathological, will then achieve systemic organisation in a 
pathological way. This might be done, for example, by escalating a particular 
emotion or behaviour in the group. In this way, an initial discouragement would 
become a clinical depression. According to Bateson (Keeney, 1983}, this was 
related to the observation that each member of a distressed family would be likely 
to have different forms of escalating behaviour. The family organism or system 
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achieves organisation and homeostasis by balancing the escalations of each 
member. 
Clearly, when one refers back to the structural model of group 
psychotherapy (Saravay, 1985), one can only conclude that it too shares certain 
core assumptions in line with a cybernetic epistemology. Firstly, the therapist is 
very much a part of the semantic organisation of the group or system. In other 
words, in terms of the group transference, he or she is associated with members' 
perceptions of the group process and the meanings formulated. In reciprocal 
fashion, the therapist is also both influenced by and an influence upon group 
dynamics as these are manifested in each transference phase. Furthermore, in 
true Batesonian fashion, individual and system are inextricably connected in that 
the dynamics of each group member and the dynamics of the group as a whole 
are seen to be isomorphic. 
As is the case with the structural model, the shift towards a cybernetic 
epistemology involves attending, therefore, to the ways in which families or groups 
are organised as systems. This entails focussing not solely on the individual but 
on the entire context (May, 1977). 
Bateson's attention to context resulted in some further fruitful insight into 
processes of learning (May, 1977). Before we, however, delve into Bateson's 
conception of interpersonal learning, it is, perhaps, necessary that we be 
reminded of what Freud had to say in this regard. 
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CHAPTER 8 
TRANSFERENCE AS LEARNING 
Freud's Understanding of Interpersonal Learning 
and its Relation to Transference Analysis and Resolution 
According to Freudian theory, the constitutional foundation of personality 
structure and development is termed the id. The id, which is largely unconscious, 
refers to all that is inherited, present at birth, fixed and, therefore, not susceptible 
to learning. The demands of the external environment, often in conflict with those 
of the id, result in the development of the ego. The ego functions to mediate 
between the demands of the id on the one hand, and the internalised demands of 
the external environment, termed the superego, on the other hand. When 
learning takes place, then, it takes place at the level of the ego (Hjelle & Ziegler, 
1976). 
The ego, or the conscious self, makes use of defense mechanisms which 
function to repress and make unconscious, id impulses unacceptable to the 
superego. Transference is, in fact, as mentioned in chapter 1, the fruit of a 
particular defense mechanism called displacement. With displacement, the 
expression of an impulse (deriving from the id) is redirected from a more 
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threatening object or person to a less threatening object or person (Hjelle & 
Ziegler, 1976). 
With the analysis of transference, the therapist reveals to the patient the 
original object of the emotions that have been displaced and the significance of 
that object for the patient and his or her interpretations of the world (Hjelle & 
Ziegler, 1976). Implicit, then, is the notion that interpersonal learning is brought 
about when a person is made aware of the tension between the external 
environment, represented by the therapist in the above instance, and the 
influence of his or her internal world on its interpretation. In other words, the 
patient becomes aware that the premises which govern his or her interpretation of 
the environment are questionable. 
Such a formulation of interpersonal learning is more or less compatible with 
Bateson Is "deutero-learning", a term used to describe a higher order of learning in 
which the person learns to learn (Ruesch & Bateson, 1951, p.202). For Bateson 
(1979), learning consists of three components, namely stimulus, response and 
reinforcement. These three components form the context of learning in which the 
response maintains the stimulus and the reinforcement maintains the response. 
Furthermore, in Bateson's (1979) words: "Response by learner reinforces the 
stimulus provided by teacher. And so on" (p.147). When the learner obtains a 
view or double description of this process, deutero-learning takes place. As 
Bateson puts it: "there is a learning of context ... this learning of context springs out 
of a species of double description which goes with relationship and interaction" 
(p.148). 
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Bateson's Understanding of Interpersonal Learning 
and its Relation to Transference Analysis and Resolution. 
Bateson, writing together with Ruesch (Ruesh & Bateson, 1951 ), believed 
that interpersonal learning, as deutero-learning, takes place when a person 
perceives a change in the rules governing his or her interpersonal environment. 
For example, such learning might take place in a work situation, with the arrival of 
a new boss with original ideas as to how the particular company or department in 
question should be run. As the employees perceive a difference in the demands 
placed on them and their response to these demands and so on, so interpersonal 
learning with regard to the behaviour of their new boss, their old boss and 
themselves will take place. 
It was, furthermore, Bateson's proposition that the context within which 
learning takes place contributes to the development of the character structure of 
the subject or individual (Ruesch and Bateson, 1951 ). As he or she learns to 
learn, he or she develops expectations of and ideas about the context in which 
the learning takes place. According to this conceptual framework, we may 
therefore expect a Pavlovian subject to: 
[E]xpect a world in which he has no control over the good and evil 
which may befall him; he will try to know when they are coming, and 
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he can take appropriate visceral precautions, readying his body for 
the food or pain. He can, so to speak, look for omens to tell him 
when the disaster will come, but it will not occur to him that he can 
do anything about the disaster, except within his own body. (p. 216) 
Thus people, for Bateson (May, 1977), carry with them an understanding of 
the world and an interpretation of it based on the type of context within which 
significant interpersonal learning took place. Drawing on Bateson, we can say 
that this understanding and interpretation determines their character structure. 
Their character structure, in turn, influences their interpretation of the world. This 
understanding and interpretation then becomes reflected in the nature of the 
transference. Thus a person whose significant interpersonal learning occurred in 
a context in which he or she was constantly attacked by significant others may 
develop a character structure in which he or she presents as the perpetual victim. 
Transference behaviour might then manifest as the expectation that the therapist 
will in some way punish or harm the patient. 
Most importantly, however, in line with Bateson1s epistemological biases, 
there is an interaction between the person and the context of learning (May, 
1977). This means that when the context changes and the subject has to learn to 
learn new rules, he or she develops propositions about contexts in the process. 
This Bateson called 11 Learning TW0 11 (May, 1977, pp.86-87). May explains 
Bateson's viewpoint in the following way: 
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"Now the context itself changes. The premises on the basis of which one 
learns now shift. Contexts which are new to the learner may induce such 
learning. One 'learns to learn' in a new way" (pp. 86-87). 
An example of this type of learning would be that which occurs with the 
change of context that is the psychodynamic psychotherapy situation. As the 
psychotherapist, analysing the transference, comments on the patient's 
idiosyncratic, inappropriate behaviour, the person's view of the context and all the 
facts he or she has learned, take on a new meaning. In a private conversation 
with May (1977), Bateson described transference and transference analysis as 
follows: 
The analysand brings to the analysis old ways of perceiving a 
relationship to a senior male. He perceives and acts to the analysis 
in terms of this old (now obsolete) Learning Two. By "analysis of the 
transference" he is pushed to replace the old Learning Two with a 
new Learning Two, and to discover about Learning Two. (p. 87) 
The above description relates to a cybernetic understanding of transference 
reactions in the context of individual psychotherapy. But what of a cybernetic 
understanding of transference in the context of group therapy? 
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Transference and Countertransference in Group Psychotherapy 
Transference and Countertransference as Scapegoating. 
In 1985, a paper was published in the International Journal of Group 
Psychotherapy in which the author attempted to apply a cybernetic perspective of 
family dynamics to psychoanalytic group psychotherapy. Like Andolfi et al. 
(1983), this author, namely Colson, described healthy families as providing the 
kind of holding environment which allowed their members to differentiate and 
advance in life. Rigid families, on the other hand, were characterised by the 
maintenance of fixed roles which sheltered family members from the fear that 
change and differentiation would provoke disintegration and inevitable death, both 
to the individual and to the family. The emergence of an identified patient then 
served to direct the focus of family members onto the problem member and away 
from their own needs for differentiation, as the following excerpt from Colson 
(1985) illustrates: 
Pathological forms of protectiveness and scapegoating are both 
involved in which the symptomatic individual maintains an 
enmeshment with the family which saves them from anxieties 
associated with change. The lower the level of differentiation among 
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the family members, the more severely disturbed the symptomatic 
family member will be. Also the lower the level of differentiation, the 
greater the difficulty for all involved in extricating themselves from 
I 
the rigidly defined roles which maintain the family enmeshment. (p. 
505) 
Within the group therapy system, any point of change or stress, such as 
the progress of a member, was likely, according to Colson (1985), to produce a 
problem in the form of a particular member selected for scapegoating by the 
group: 
This process is analogous to the disturbed family's unconscious 
selection of one of their members to be the family "problem", thereby 
placing one person in the focus of attention and concern and saving 
the others from facing difficult issues in their own lives and in their 
relationship with one another. (p.507 -508) 
The dynamics of a therapy group are, furthermore, derived from each 
member's family system. For Colson (1985), then, "[a]ttention to such dynamics 
is facilitated by [a] thorough knowledge of each patient's family background and 
by sensitivity oneself to the variety of ways in which differentiation may be 
inadvertently discouraged" (p.513). 
Once together therefore, the therapy group forms a new system wherein, in 
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times of stress, members are likely to make use of interpersonal patterns which 
are derived from their present family systems and which are consequently 
designed to maintain stability. 
Colson (1985) appears to view transference as referring to the 
interpersonal patterns of relating which each member brings to the group from his 
or her present family system. These then become particularly represented in the 
scapegoating of a certain member who becomes the problem patient of the group 
11family". Transference, according to this view, pervades all the group 
relationships, both those directed at the therapist and those between members. 
Furthermore, as with psychoanalytically~based models, the group as a dynamic 
unit, is founded upon transference factors. Clearly, then, Colson's formulation, is 
non-dualistic in that the therapist is implicated in the group process. 
With regard to countertransference, Colson (1985) offers a vignette 
illustrating how a particular patient reproduced certain interpersonal patterns of 
relating derived from his family in the therapy group, and the countertransference-
based collusion of the therapists. He then makes the point that: 
The primary technical error is the tendency for the therapist, in the guise of 
appropriate technique to unconsciously collude with a scapegoating 
process, thereby discouraging differentiated growth. The result is that 
group members remain stuck in rigidly defined roles precluding for each the 
experience of alternative relationship paradigms. (p.513) 
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Implicit in the above quotation is the notion that the therapist is able to 
observe the dynamics of the group with objectivity, that objectivity is possible. 
Whilst the therapist may view aspects of the group process subjectively, this is 
only as a consequence of countertransference factors. He or she must, however, 
be objective in order to perceive problems and to encourage differentiation. 
With this paper, Colson (1985) undoubtedly makes a valiant attempt to 
describe transference and countertransference in terms of Andolfi et al!s (1983) 
conceptualization of differentiation and cohesion. This conceptualization, in turn, 
is based on the cybernetic notions of change and stability. A possible caution is 
that it is uncertain that growth is always connected to differentiation. For 
example, one could argue that an individual might experience his or her 
identification with a particular group as intensely meaningful and enriching 
because he had always perceived himself to be isolated from others. This 
individual's psychological growth in the direction of increased sociability and 
interpersonal trust would be unlikely to provoke a stressful reaction in terms of 
scapegoating behaviour in the other members of the group system. 
Whilst Colson (1985) implicates mechanisms of transference and 
countertransference with scapegoating behaviour, like the proponents of the 
psychoanalytic structural model, he also makes it clear that the group, as a 
dynamic entity, is founded upon transference factors. Another theorist, Mendell 
(1981 ), isolates only its effect as a transient impediment to change. 
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Transference as an Impediment to Change 
For Mendell (1981 ), operating also from a cybernetic orientation, 
transference, as a mode of interaction inherited from a problematic, other system, 
is to be viewed as a temporary barrier to change. Hence, it is imperative that the 
group therapy leader, who is both an agent of stability and an agent of change, 
confront any manifestations of transference in the group. 
In the therapist's capacity as a catalyst for change (Mendell, 1981 ), he or 
she must riot only challenge transference behaviour, but also preserve his or her 
personal autonomy. This is important because it is his or her external, 
independent outlook which serves as an outside point of reference for the group. 
From this point of reference, the group system may acquire new information and 
be energized to new capacities. It is important to emphasise here that the 
therapist's perceptions of group behaviour are viewed by Mendell as new 
information for the group. The use of the word, information, must be taken to 
mean the input or feedback introduced into a system. In this context, the use of 
the word, 'information', does not necessarily imply that some value of truth or 
objectivity is attached to it, as may be the case concerning its use in other 
contexts. 
For Mendell (1981 ), the group is energized to new capacities in terms of 
the regulation of both the boundaries defining the group system and those 
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boundaries defining the therapist's own personal subsystem. Such regulation may 
be carried out through the setting of ground rules. A ground rule might be, for 
example, that members do not interrupt each other. Whatever these rules are, 
they are intended to nurture constructive communication and to erase the 
destructive modes of interaction, known as transference behaviour, originating in 
other systems. 
Clearly, however, the implication of all this is that boundaries are 
manifested both outwardly, in interaction, and inwardly, in interpretation. As 
interpretation, the therapeutic maintenance of boundaries may then possibly 
mimic traditional forms of transference analysis. 
Transference as a Sum Relationship 
Mendell (1981) describes a systeming relationship as one in which the 
boundaries between members are permeable to information from each party. 
In a sum relationship, on the other hand, a one-way boundary exists, 
controlled by one party (Mendell, 1981 ). We might describe the boundary in such 
a situation as being semi-permeable, or open only to information being imparted 
from the controlling party. Hence, the situation arises where the controlling party 
is unable to include, in interpretations of the other, any notion contradicting that 
controlling party's basic premises or assumptions of the other. In a sum 
relationship, therefore. the controlling party does not perceive incoming 
messages, but seeks rather to transmit information. An example here would be 
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the autocractic employer, in a work situation, who perceives his or her employees 
in a fixed fashion and does not pay much attention to what these employees have 
to say about themselves, each other or the job at hand. For this employer, his or 
her employees are purely incompetent or diligent workers, to be interpreted 
merely according to their capacity or incapacity to follow orders. 
Transference, as a phenomenon, is a sum relationship for Mendell (1981) 
since the patient's interpretation of the therapist is manifested in an interactional 
style deriving from his family system. As transference persists, incoming, 
constructive information necessary to bringing about a change in interpretation is 
blocked from entering the group system. Mendell does not elaborate on the 
interactional mechanisms through which the therapist is prevented from 
introducing information into the group. We might expect, however, that these are 
to be found in the controlling party or person's interpretations of the therapist's or 
group leader's messages. 
At the point that the controlling person or party is made to see the 
inaccuracies of his or her interpretation and the transference is resolved. This 
explanation is consistent with the understanding of interpersonal learning, as 
formulated by both Freud and Bateson. Speaking from the point of view of a 
cybernetic epistemology, this event may also be described in terms of information 
from the therapeutic system entering to catalyze the individual member and, 
hence also the group of which he or she is a part, towards change. 
Further change then becomes possible with the nurturance of systeming 
relationships between group members and the consequent interchange of 
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information and energy. The implication of this is that as the group changes, the 
group therapy leader and his or her subsystem also receives input from the group 
and is also inevitably altered. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
Second-order cybernetics, discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, 
elaborates on the bond between therapist and patient or group and also on 
connected problems with the notion of objectivity. Both of these factors, that is, 
the bond between therapist and patient, and the issue of whether objectivity and, 
therefore, information regarding a relationship is possible, are germinal to any 
discussion of transference. It seems clear that the notion of information implies 
that of objectivity, in any context aside from a discussion of cybernetic processes, 
where it seems to be synonymous with input. 
If human experience is understood to be immersed in subjectivity, how can 
a therapist ever be certain that the messages he or she believes to be emanating 
from a relationship, do not, in fact, derive solely from the workings of his or her 
own consciousness. 
The psychodynamic perspective, the interpersonal point of view, and the 
approaches discussed above, assume the possibility of objective description on 
the part of the therapist. This is perhaps, with the possible exception of Mendell 
(1981) whose cybernetic account of group processes is premised on the notion of 
feedback deriving from the therapist or group members. This feedback is viewed 
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as input which is not necessarily purely subjective or objective. Any assumption, 
however, that objectivity is possible is, as has been mentioned earlier, in conflict 
with the basic tenets of second-order cybernetics. 
If we bracket objectivity, and hence, interpersonal information, as has been 
suggested by, for instance, Varela (1989}, the therapist dealing with the issues of 
transference and countertransference consequently has the following options. 
The first is, as has been indicated in the introduction, to dispense with the 
notions of transference and countertransference. After all, every perception is 
subjective and idiosyncratic. To delineate certain behaviours as more subjective 
and idiosyncratic in origin than other behaviours, as is considered the case with 
transference, is arbitrary and a question of degree. Furthermore, as regards 
Greensonls (1965) criterion of appropriacy: who is to decide as to what is and 
what is not appropriate? 
The second option is to proceed as if objectivity and, indeed, objective 
interpersonal information were possible (Golann, 1987). For Golann one may 
appeal to consensus for a notion of relative accuracy, thus acknowledging 
recursiveness and subjectivity without abandoning descriptive standards and 
methods. In elaboration, he states that, 11 [o]ne possible solution to the difficulty of 
describing ambiguous and 
complicated interactional events is to separate observation from explanation while 
attempting to achieve reasonably detailed, disciplined descriptionsu (p. 339). 
The therapist uti I izing this option would then view transference and 
countertransference as labels for descriptions of his or her view of the client-
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therapist relationship. 
Unfortunately, this proposition of Golann's (1987) is in itself problematic. 
Firstly, any perception or description is, as Bateson (Ruesch & Bateson, 1951) 
amongst others has pointed out, epistemologically-based. For Bateson, 
perception is founded upon difference, upon the distinction between figure and 
ground. The identification of figure is arbitrary and influenced by epistemology. 
We, therefore, cannot separate observation or description from explanation, as 
Golann (1987) proposes. Secondly, Golann's utilization of consensus as an 
arbitrator between opposing perceptions is also a problem. It should be 
remembered that there was once consensus that the earth was flat. 
This being so, and if we are to accept, as Golann (1987) does, that 
subjectivity is inevitable, therapy becomes a description or co-construction of 
reality between the therapist and patient or the group leader and group members. 
The therapist can no longer believe that he or she offers the patient or 
group member objective information as to his or her interpersonal functioning with 
any certainty. Concepts such as transference and countertransference may only 
be defined as the avowedly subjective descriptions of the therapist's view of his or 
her relationship with the client. This is not to imply, however, that the therapist is 
not able to offer change to the patient or client. Such change, as has been 
pointed out earlier in this work, will come riding on the back of any description the 
therapist or client makes. 
It is interesting to note, in this regard, that Racker's (1968) totalistic 
classification of countertransference is more compatible with a constructivist 
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perspective than is Kiesler's (1982a) formulation of impact messages. From the 
constructivist perspective and from Racker's (1968) point of view, 
countertransference is not a trap the therapist falls into, but an inevitability. Both 
of these perspectives assume that the therapist's responses to the client are 
unavoidably subjective. Racker does, however, appear to assume that the 
therapist is able to stand back and analyse his or her identifications in order to 
obtain information or objectivity. 
Despite cross-paradigmatic compatibilities such as that between Racker's 
(1968) approach to countertransference and that of the constructivists, most 
attempts to incorporate a notion of transference within either an interpersonal or 
cybernetic model, would be forced to deviate somewhat from Greenson's (1965) 
psychoanalytically-based definition of transference. The focus of this deviation is 
essentially founded on the idea that transference arises idiosyncratically from a 
particular early experience of the patient or client. Both the interpersonal and 
cybernetic perspectives do not locate problems in living as being based 
necessarily in the crucial early stages of life, as do most psychoanalytic 
perspectives, with some exceptions, for example Rank (Rank & Ferenczi, 1925). 
Indeed, such problems are generally seen to be manifestations of present 
relationships. 
As representative of present relationships, the identification of transference 
and countertransference can nevertheless convey to both the constructivist and 
the non-constructivist therapist alike, some subjective indication as to the patient 
or client's reality and the nature of his or her problems in living. 
71. 
Both transference and countertransference are, then, useful therapeutic 
concepts because they provide the therapist with a view of the interpersonal style 
and issues around differentiation that accompany a particular patient or client as 
he or she negotiates different contexts. When this information is combined with 
the patient or client1S view of others and others! view of the patient or client, as is 
the case in group psychotherapy, a double description and a richer sense of the 
system and its ingredients are obtained. 
72. 
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